KEY TAKEAWAYS
KEY TAKEAWAYS
At the end of 2024, the annual U.S. Department of Defense report on military and security developments in China reinforced evolving assessments of China’s rapid nuclear expansion with an alarming projection: The U.S. expects China to have 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030 despite having maintained a nuclear arsenal of approximately 300 warheads for decades.
Without a publicly stated rationale from China, countries both in the immediate region and beyond must weigh what these developments mean for their own security.
India is one such country. As of yet, it is unclear what its response might be. Like China, India maintains a nuclear philosophy built around a “no first use” (NFU) doctrine, with a focus on the political rather than military utility of nuclear weapons. However, since 1998 the Indian nuclear force has largely been developed with China in mind — and still operates under the assumption that China would maintain a relatively small arsenal. If India’s nuclear posture were to respond to China’s expansion, this would have broad ramifications on Pakistan’s nuclear force, Indo-Pacific security and potentially global nuclear politics.
Even so, there has been relatively little research on India’s thinking. While the Indian government has made no official statements so far on its response to China’s nuclear expansion, a recent USIP special report containing interviews with former senior Indian officials and other members of the Indian strategic community provides some indication about how New Delhi may react to these developments.
Despite the official silence, the Indian government is undoubtedly taking China’s nuclear expansion seriously. India has been monitoring China’s nuclear forces closely, and there is some indication that Indian officials may have been aware of internal Chinese debates about nuclear expansion for some time. Indian officials also appear to have shared this assessment, at least with Russia.
As is the case with analysis of China’s nuclear program more broadly, there is debate on the drivers of China’s nuclear expansion — ranging from a desire to become a global power to concerns about the U.S. anti-ballistic missile shield and the impact this may have on China’s second-strike capability (which is a country’s ability to launch a nuclear response in the event of a nuclear attack).
Despite the debate on China’s motivations, there is general consensus among those interviewed that China will maintain its NFU status. However, Indian analysts also expect that China will broaden the definition of NFU to permit a variety of nuclear operations, including potentially a launch-on-warning (LOW) option, which is the launching of a nuclear attack in response to warnings of an attack. The expectation is that over time, an expansion and diversification of the Chinese nuclear arsenal will lead to contradictions within the NFU doctrine, leading to greater flexibility in what China might consider “first use” and thereby diluting China’s NFU doctrine.
An expansion and diversification of the Chinese nuclear arsenal will lead to … greater flexibility in what China might consider 'first use.'
Nevertheless, Indian analysts do not expect China to give up its NFU formally, as the doctrine provides China with diplomatic and normative benefits. However, there was some concern that China may threaten nuclear use in the event of a Taiwan contingency to discourage Western involvement — a strategy that would require Beijing to threaten the first use of nuclear weapons.
Surprisingly, despite some concerns about China’s possible abandonment of its NFU, there is little support for India to move away from or change its own NFU posture (though support for India’s NFU was also lukewarm).
From interviews, the sense was that among India’s various national security institutions, the Indian military was the most uncomfortable with the NFU — as it is essentially a reactive posture — while others supported it for precisely that reason. Despite these differences, there was little enthusiasm for abandoning the policy entirely, which was viewed as robust and dynamic enough to potentially be stretched to accommodate a variety of other options, including LOW options, as China may be doing.
The clearest areas of India’s concerns were land-based missile systems such as the DF-41 and a potential hypersonic glide vehicle based on the missile. Equally, Indian analysts are concerned about potential dual-use systems — essentially, missiles that could carry a conventional or a nuclear warhead — that could lead to possible problems in distinguishing between the two. There was concern among some interviewees about China’s tactical nuclear weapons. But this was not widespread, with most of the concern focused on strategic systems that could directly target India.
Indian analysts were particularly concerned about the intermediate-range DF-26 because its high-accuracy and dual-use nature could potentially make it a dangerous counterforce weapon (a strategy that would target India’s military sites). Additionally, China’s decision to put control of all long-range missiles under the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Forces (PLARF) added to concerns about India’s ability to discern conventional weapons from nuclear-tipped missiles.
Indian analysts were less concerned with China’s sea-based deterrent, and even less so about China’s air-based deterrent force. These were seen as old and technologically inferior, and thus easily countered. However, it should be noted that these interviews were held before much information had come out about China’s new stealth bomber prototypes, the H-20 and the JH-XX. Those who were aware of the H-20 saw it as a vanity project that China did not have the capacity to build.
There were significant differences between Indian analysts over assessments of China’s nuclear capabilities — with some even skeptical about whether China had a triad, considering the weakness in the sea-based leg of its nuclear force. Along with the aforementioned disagreements over China’s motivations, there were also disagreements over the importance of China’s recent institutional changes, such as the creation of the PLARF and the recently terminated Strategic Support Force. Some saw these institutional innovations as important, while others were of the view that China’s civilian leaders were in control irrespective of these institutional changes.
On the crucial question of how India should respond to China’s nuclear expansion, there were fundamental disagreements. Some of those interviewed felt that India should build up its nuclear arsenal, while others were much more sanguine about the consequences of China’s nuclear build-up. This mirrors to some extent the opinions among experts in other countries about how best to respond to China’s actions, with some believing it requires a much more robust response compared to others.
Nonetheless, there was consensus that India should respond in some fashion.
Those who were more concerned about China’s nuclear expansion pointed out that China could have more than 1,000 warheads by the end of the decade. This, together with the slight numerical superiority of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal at the time of the interviews (note that more recent assessments suggest India had a slight edge over Pakistan in number of warheads), should be a matter of concern for India, in their view.
China’s nuclear expansion could potentially lead to more aggressive behavior against India. An outlier opinion even suggested that India’s deterrent itself could be called into question as a result of China’s nuclear expansion.
China’s nuclear expansion could potentially lead to more aggressive behavior against India.
The Indian analysts who were more sanguine felt that what mattered was not the numbers involved in China’s nuclear expansion but rather the qualitative advances that China was making. India’s response, thus, should also focus on the quality of its nuclear force, such as the range of missiles, better submarine-based deterrent forces, and superior MIRV technology (MIRV is short for multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles).
There was general agreement that India should respond — with suggestions ranging from relatively benign responses such as reviewing India’s nuclear force structure to much more radical ones such as resuming nuclear testing and even revising the NFU posture. This suggests that India will respond in some manner, though Indian leaders tend to be risk-averse and conservative in dealing with nuclear policy. For example, though Prime Minister Modi originally campaigned on revising the NFU, this was quickly altered to “reviewing” the NFU after he was elected. Thus, it is unlikely that India will radically revise its nuclear force or resume nuclear testing, unless other countries started testing first.
The U.S. response to changes in India’s nuclear program was also an important consideration, though there were differences among Indian analysts regarding how they thought the U.S. would react. Some felt that the United States would understand if India expanded its nuclear arsenal or resumed testing, especially if Indian weapons did not target the U.S., while others were less certain.
But there was clear consensus that India should engage with the United States in considering its response. This potentially offers a fruitful area for deepening U.S.-India dialogue and shaping a coordinated regional response to China’s nuclear expansion.
Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan is a resident senior fellow at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.